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FEDERAL JUDGES AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER:
TRUMAN TO REAGAN
by
CRAIG R. DUCAT*
AND
ROBERT L. DUDLEY**
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary research in judicial politics has shown that political attitudes
and values significantly influence the votes cast by judges in the decision of concrete
cases.' There has also been a convincing demonstration of the linkage between the
political values of various presidential administrations and the appointment of
federal judges who then have effected basic policy changes through their decisions,2
although presidents have shown differences in interest and commitment to judicial
policymaking premised on ideological conviction. 3 However, despite the fact that
more than a decade has now elapsed since the various legal controversies included
under the generic title of Watergate, there remains a complete absence of any
empirical examination of federal judicial decisionmaking on the issues of presiden-
tial power, as distinguished from inquiries about federal judicial support for policy
items comprising the president's agenda.
*Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University; B.A., Syracuse University, 1966; M.A.,
University of Minnesota, 1968; Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1970.
-Assistant Professor of Political Science, George Mason University; B.A., Western Illinois University,
1970; M.A., Northern Illinois University, 1975; Ph.D., Northern Illinois University, 1980.
See, e.g., C. PRITCHETIr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948); T. BECKER, POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN
JURISPRUDENCE (1964); G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959); the JUDICIAL MIND
(1965); THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED (1974); HUMAN JURISPRUDENCE (1975); Pritchett, The Development of
Judicial Research, FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH (J. Grossman and J. Tanenhaus, eds. 1969); W. MURPHY
& J. TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW (1972); H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING (1979);
Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study ofJudicial Behavior, 5 POL.
BEHAV. 7 (1983); Tate, The Methodology of Judicial Behavior Research: A Review and Critique, 5 POL.
BEHAV. 51 (1983).
2 H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS (1974); R. CARP & C. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983) [hereinafter CARP & ROWLAND]; Goldman, Judicial Appointments to the
United States Courts of Appeals, 1967 WIs. L. REV. 186; Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term
Appointments, 68 JUDICATURE 313 (1985); Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at
Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324 (1987); Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The
Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48 (1986); H. SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE
CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (1988).
3 H. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS (1972), HEREINAFTER H. CHASE, CARP & ROWLAND, supra
note 2, at 53-57.
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While there is a considerable literature consisting of commentaries on the
substance of federal court decisions about presidential power,4 there has been little
quantitative investigation of political factors influencing judicial decisionmaking in
those cases.' Analyzing the votes cast by judges at all levels of the federal judiciary
during the post-World War II era, this study examines several conventional expec-
tations about the impact of such political factors as political party affiliation and
presidential appointment, the difference between the foreign and military affairs and
domestic policy areas, length of judicial tenure, and judges' possession of prior
legislative or executive experience.
The relevance of such political factors was underscored by Justice Jackson
over a quarter century ago in his remarkably candid concurrence in the Steel Seizure
Case.6 In his opinion, now famous as an essay on the causes and contours of
presidential leadership and the Supreme Court's limited capacity for fastening
restraints upon it, Justice Jackson observed that, in resolving these sorts of cases, a
judge's policy preferences and practical experience were likely to prove decisive. In
any event, he concluded, scholarly materials "only suppl[y] more or less apt
quotations from respected sources on each side of any question[]" and therefore
"largely cancel each other. 7 The text of court decisions he also found "indecisive
because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in the most
narrow way."'
An examination of the judicial treatment of presidential power from a political
perspective would thus appear to be long overdue, especially in light of the events
of the postwar era. Reviewing judicial responses to presidential power from the Steel
Seizure to Watergate, one commentator announced the emergence of "new patterns
in judicial control of the presidency." 9 Traditional works had concluded that the
courts were largely ineffectual in restraining the expansion of presidential power,'0
and that the few constraints courts had imposed upon the executive in peacetime all
but disappeared in crisis times." In any case, like Justice Jackson, we doubted that
I R. BLAND, T. HINDSON, & J. PELTASON, CORWIN'S THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS (5TH ED. 1984); G.
SCHUBERT, THE PRESIDENCY IN THE COURTS (1957); R. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY
(1971); A. MILLER, PRESIDENTAL POWER IN A NUTSHELL (1977).
-A rare example is M. GENOVESE, THE SUPREME COURT, THE CONSTITUTION, AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1980).
As contrasted with the domain of our study, which is limited to judicial decisions involving the president's
statutory or constitutional authority, Genovese's inquiry extended beyond this to include presidential effec-
tiveness with the Supreme Court generally, i.e., an administration's success in getting judges to accept
political preferences that accorded with the executive's public policy agenda. See infra note 13.
6 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 634-635.
Id. at 635.
9 Dionisopoulos, New Patterns in Judicial Control of the Presidency: 1950's to 1970's, 10 AKRON L. REV.
1 (1976).
10 See supra note 4.
11 E. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1947); J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER
LINCOLN (1951); C. ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF (1951, 1976); G. SCHUBERT,
supra note 4.
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judicial rhetoric could be counted on to supply the answer. Our analysis is therefore
directed to examining what federal judges do, not what they say--to how they vote,
not how they talk.
DATA
The decisional data for this study consist of the 1,337 votes cast by federal
judges and justices in 531 cases on presidential power decided by federal courts at
all levels between January 1949 and June 1984. We first consulted Shepard's
Citations and screened all of the cases which were listed as citing any portion of the
following parts of the Constitution: article I, sec. 7, article II, or amendments XII,
XX, XXII, or XXV. From this general collection, all of the cases dealing with
matters which could not reasonably be described as relating to presidential power
were eliminated (e.g., presidential electors, voting rights, the treaty power gener-
ally). The collection of cases was reduced further by deleting all cases which merely
cited one or more of the constitutional provisions identified above only in a
peripheral or illustrative way (usually in a footnote). The cases included in this study
identified via Shepard's mentioned the president or executive in the headnotes or in
points of law or else contained substantial discussion or reference to presidential
power in the opinion (usually a paragraph or more).
The second source for identifying cases included in this study was Westlaw.
Reliance upon a resource capable of reaching beyond only constitutional cases was
essential because many important cases on presidential power have been decided
without implicating constitutional provisions (e.g., impoundment, the Iranian hos-
tage settlement). As Martin Shapiro pointed out long ago, there is much more to
political power than constitutional power. Decisions governing statutory authority
are perhaps just as important and such cases are more numerous than those implicat-
ing constitutional provisions. 12 Because a simple Westlaw search of federal cases
using the terms "president" and "executive" would turn up thousands of com-
pletely irrelevant cases (involving, e.g., presidents or executives of corporations,
unions, school boards), we searched Westlaw for all federal cases decided after 1948
in which "executive" or variations of the word "president" appeared in the
headnotes or as topics, or where those terms appeared in individual points of law
under any of the following topics: "war," "national emergency," "constitutional
law," or "United States." Even this narrowing of the Westlaw search turned up
more than 3,500 cases. This field was then screened according to the following
principles which governed inclusion of cases in this study. We required that the
discussion of presidential power in the opinion be directly related to the decision of
the case, in other words, that it not be peripheral. We eliminated disputes in which
judicial reference to congressional and presidential power was made in the same
breath so that there was no separate mention or focus on executive power. We also
deleted cases involving administrative, as distinguished from executive, power.
2 M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT (1964).
Spring, 1989]
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Although on occasion it was difficult to draw this distinction, we sought to restrict
the inclusion of suits naming cabinet officers, other officeholders inferior to the
president, and agencies to those cases in which validity of an executive order was at
issue (as distinguished from controversies over the interpretation of such an order,
unless the president's intention in the order was clear and under attack). In other
cases where a cabinet officer or officeholder inferior to the president was impleaded
as the defendant, we included the case if there was evidence in the opinion that the
officer was executing an order from the president, where the matter at hand was of
such significance it was inconceivable that the president would not have been
involved, or where the opinion dealt with the officeholder's actions in such a manner
as to refer to specific powers of the executive branch or to identify the officer as the
alter ego of the president. We also eliminated from the Westlaw collection cases
where the suit named the United States as a party and the interest identified and dis-
cussed by the court was "governmental" as distinguished from one specifically
executive or presidential, or where there was only a very casual mention of the
executive and far greater emphasis was placed on the governmental interest of the
United States. Obviously, cases which named the president or a former president
personally were included. Since the focus of our case data base was decisions on
executive power, not all cases reflecting on a president's political power or his
policies were included. Only those implicating the constitutional or statutory
authority of his office were counted. 3 We were also reluctant to include cases
involving the claims of Indians unless the involvement of presidential power was
explicit. Cases involving threats against the president's life or the validity of
sanctions imposed for demonstrating against him or making statements critical of his
administration were invariably not included because those disputes did not involve
presidential power but the validity of certain criminal processes.
The association of specific court decisions with particular presidents was
governed by the exact dates of presidential tenure. Where the decisional process in
a given case overlapped the replacement of one administration by another, this was
duly noted. The only exception to the assignment of court decisions according to the
1 In describing the precise focus of this study, we think the difference between looking at presidential policy
preferences and presidential power needs to be emphasized. The decisions we included directly implicate
the president's authority. Ours is not an inquiry into the general success rate of presidential administrations
in persuading the federal courts to adopt or validate the executive's views of policy. Were this our focus, we
would have examined the won-lost record of the solicitor general, since his views in litigation are taken to
mirror administration policy (see, Segal, Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the Warren
and Burger Courts, 41 WEST. POL. Q. 135 (1988); Segal & Reedy, The Supreme Court and Sex
Discrimination: The Role of the Solicitor General, 41 WEST. POL. Q. 553 (1988); L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH
JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987)). Consequently, decisions included in our
study do not include cases on the exclusionary rule, affirmative action, the death penalty, and a host of other
controversial issues about which administrations have sought to influence the federal courts but which,
without more, do not implicate the president's powers of office. However, controversies about the pocket
veto, mandatory drug testing of federal employees, and the conduct of covert operations abroad, for example,
are included because such disputes directly implicate the statutory or constitutional authority of the president.
We alluded to this distinction by way of contrasting the focus of this study with that taken by Genovese, see
supra note 5.
[Vol. 22:4AKRON LAW REVIEW
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then-incumbent president occurred for a number of cases involving suits by or
against former President Nixon which had their origins in the events of Watergate
or certain surveillance practices of his administration. Because each of these cases
specifically named the former president as plaintiff or defendant, these cases were
regarded as personal to Nixon.
Background data on the judges and justices participating in the decision of
these cases were obtained from a number of standard sources. 4 Data on the identity
of the appointing president, the length of a judge's or justice's tenure on the bench
at the time of decision, and the nature of his or her experience prior to appointment
were obtained for all those whose votes are included here. As anticipated, political
party affiliation at the time of appointment proved to be much more difficult to
obtain. Using the standard sources cited, newspapers, Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Reports, and information supplied by helpful colleagues in the discipline
who had collected data on federal judges for their own research,'" we were able to
link the judges's or justice's party affiliation to 1,330 of the 1,337 votes cast.
DIscuSSION
We found a high level of support overall for presidential power among the
votes cast by federal judges. Of the 1,337 votes cast, two-thirds (67 percent) upheld
the exercise of presidential power. Presidents fared poorest with federal district
judges who voted to uphold exercises of executive power 59.4 percent of the time
(224 out of 377 votes). Chief executives did better before the Supreme Court where
the justices favored the actions taken by presidents with 66.3 percent of their votes
(275 out of 415). The postwar presidents were most successful with federal appeals
court judges who validated the exercise of presidential power with 73.4 percent of
their votes (400 out of 545). Thus, although some variation could be found among
the different levels of the federal judiciary, support for the exercise of presidential
power was consistently strong.'
6
Political Party Affiliation and Presidential Appointment
Because political party affiliation has been shown to be a useful but crude
predictor of judicial behavior, 7 we began by examining whether in general Demo-
4 JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S, JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES (2D ed. 1983); W. DORNE'rE & R. CROSS, FEDERAL
JUDICIARY ALMANAC (1984); H. CHASE, S. KRISLOV, K. BOYUM, & J. CLARK, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1976); WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1983).
'- We are indebted to professors Elliot Slotnick, C.K. Rowland, and especially Sheldon Goldman for some
of the particularly hard-to-find party affiliation data.
'6Analysis of the votes cast solely by federal district judges is presented in Ducat & Dudley, FederalDistrict
Judges and Presidential Power During the Postwar Era, 51 J. OF POL. 98 (1989). That analysis discloses
nothing peculiar about the behavior of federal district judges in such cases that significantly distinguishes
their decisionmaking behavior from that of their appellate court colleagues.
"7 See, Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AMER. POL. SC. REV. 843 (1961);
Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 63 AMER. POL. SC.
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cratic or Republican judges looked more favorably on presidential power. We
expected that Democratic judges generally would be more receptive to the exercise
of presidential power than Republicans.
This expectation seemed logical since virtually all of the federal judges
included in this study were appointed since the Depression. Given the extent to
which the expectation of vigorous presidential leadership had become linked to the
New Deal-Fair Deal-New Frontier-Great Society domestic programs of Democratic
presidents, we thought Democratic judges and justices would be much more inclined
to support exercises of presidential power than Republicans. By contrast, we
expected that Republican judges and justices, presumably much more sympathetic
to a philosophy of negative government, would be quite resistant to exercises of
presidential power.
The data presented in Table 1 provide a surprising refutation to those expec-
tations. It was Republican judges, not Democratic judges, in the postwar era who
were more receptive to exercises of presidential power. While Democratic judges
voted to uphold presidential actions 63 percent of the time, Republican judges
validated exercises of presidential power with nearly three-quarters of their votes.
REV. 57 (1969); Feeley, Another Look at the "Party Variable" in Judicial Decision-Making: An Analysis
of the Michigan Supreme Court, 4 POLITY 91 (1971); CARP& ROWLAND, supra note 2,25-32; Tate, Personal
Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and
Economic Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AMER. POL. Sc. REV. 355 (1981).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4
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TABLE 1
JUDICIAL SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENTIAL POWER BY JUDGES' PARTY AFFILIATION
Votes Cast by Votes Cast by
Democratic Judges Republican Judges
Percent Percent
Suporting Supporting
Policy Area Total President Total President
Foreign Affairs 207 65.7 146 83.6
War Powers 108 84.3 74 86.5
Spending 56 50.0 36 27.8
Law Enforcement 99 36.4 84 63.1
Appointment and Removal 92 58.7 50 88.0
Economic Regulation 37 59.5 25 76.0
Presidential Privilege
and Confidentiality 48 25.0 30 50.0
Legislative Power 42 83.3 25 88.0
Military Personnel 37 86.5 16 100.0
Pardoning 18 77.8 9 100.0
ALL AREAS 777 62.4 523 74.8
Spring, 1989]
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At least as revealing as the aggregate level of support for presidential actions
exhibited by Republican judges and justices is the consistency of such support. In
nine of the ten policy areas into which we divided the cases,'8 Republican judges
were more favorably disposed to actions taken by the president than were Demo-
cratic judges. The only policy area in which the presidential support score of
Democratic judges was greater than that of Republican judges was the spending
power where the former group voted to uphold executive actions with 50 percent of
their votes while the latter group sustained them only half as often.
Some of the differential support tied to party affiliation doubtless reflects the
effect of party affiliation as a surrogate measure of political ideology. Probably the
best evidence of this is the high degree of polarization between the two groups of
judges on the use of the president's law enforcement powers. Presumably, the nearly
30-point spread that separates the 63.1 percent support score for Republican judges
from the 36.4 percent support score for their Democratic colleagues can be explained
by the conventional juxtaposition of security and liberty interests that convention-
ally distinguishes conservatives from liberals. Since cases involving covert opera-
tions, travel restrictions, and the treatment of aliens comprised a portion of the
decisions included in the policy area broadly labeled "foreign affairs," some of the
18-point difference that separated Republican judges (83.6 percent support) from
Democratic judges (65.7 percent support) similarly can be attributed to the ideologi-
cal factor. However, no such ready explanation can account for the 30-point differ-
ence between Democratic and Republican judges in the area of presidential appoint-
ment and removal powers or the 15-point gap that separates the two groups of judges
in the policymaking area of economic regulation.
A refinement of the party variable, capable of linking voting patterns in these
highly diverse fields, is that of a judge's loyalty to the appointing president or
political party. Although presidents occasionally have been disappointed by the
performance of their judicial appointees, there is substantial evidence that "the
surprised president" is a myth. 9 Appointments to the federal bench are generally
calculated to advance policy goals of the incumbent administration, and appointees
are generally picked to support those policies.2" Moreover, since it is well-
8 The policy areas, with descriptions of their component cases, are as follows: (1) foreign affairs (embargoes,
tariff adjustments, passports, travel restrictions, covert operations, extradition, treatment of aliens, etc.); (2)
war powers (deployment of weapons, legality of engaging in undeclared war, draft registration and
regulations, trial of civilians by the military, decisions made by the president as commander-in-chief during
a declared war, etc.); (3) spending (impoundment, program termination, orders related to practices of federal
contractors); (4) law enforcement (surveillance regarding national security, censorship, keeping order,
control over prosecutions, suits to compel the executive branch to follow the law, presidential tort liability);
(5) appointment and removal; (6) economic regulation (seizure of industries, wage and price regulation,
injunction to halt a strike, etc.); (7) presidential privilege and confidentiality (executive privilege, control of
presidential papers, presidential depositions, etc.); (8) legislative power (pocket veto, legislative veto,
executive branch reorganization, proclamations, etc.); (9) military personnel (military discipline, personnel,
promotions); and (10) pardoning.
19 L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THis HONORABLE Court 50-76 (1985).
20 See supra note 2.
AKRON LAW REVIEW (Vol. 22:4
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established that the job does not seek the individual but instead that eager individuals
seek posts as federal judges,"' one might naturally expect that the political activism
of such candidates would reflect itself in a general identification with the political
positions of the party from which they were appointed. The focus of this study,
judicial treatment of presidential power, offers an especially good context in which
to examine a factor such as personal political loyalty.
Table 2 presents data on judicial voting patterns in the cases on presidential
power in terms of personal and party relationships between judges and presidents.
In addition to examining whether each judicial vote supported or opposed the
exercise of presidential power, we examined whether the judge casting the vote had
been appointed by the same president as that whose exercise of power was at issue,
and, if it were a different president (as it usually was), whether the incumbent
president whose action was at issue was of the same party or a different party than
that from which the judge had been appointed.
TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP OF PRESIDENT AND PARTY TO JUDGES' VOTES
Relation of President Supporting Opposing
in Decision to the President the President
Judge's Appointment
and Judge's Party Votes Percent Votes Percent
Same President-
Same Party 167 77.3 49 22.7
Different President-
Same Party 288 71.1 117 28.9
Same President-
Different Party 22 71.0 9 29.0
Different President-
Different Party 408 62.0 250 38.0
TOTAL 885 67.0 425 33.0
21 CHASE, supra note 3, at 29-32.
Spring, 1989]
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Table 2 shows that when the inquiry is narrowed from the frequency of
Democratic or Republican judicial support for exercises of presidential power to one
of matching judicial votes with appointing presidents and with the congruence of
party affiliation between sitting judge and president involved, a clearly discernible
pattern emerges. The strongest support for postwar presidents came from their own
appointees who were also of the president's party. Such judges voted to sustain
exercises of presidential power more than three-quarters (77.3 percent) of the time.
Occupying a sort of middle ground were those judges deciding the claims of different
presidents but of the same political party and those judges who, while appointed by
the same president as that whose power was in dispute, were of a different party
affiliation. These two groups of judges virtually tied in their support of presidential
power with a score of 71 percent. As might be expected, presidents fared poorest
with federal judges and justices who had neither been appointed by them nor shared
their party affiliation. Although these different president-different party judges still
voted to sustain exercises of presidential power with over three-fifths of their votes
(62 percent), they were clearly the group most inclined to disagree with the president,
and they did so 38 percent of the time.
In sum, the data in Table 2 lead us to the inference that the probable reason why
Republican judges exhibit higher levels of support for presidential power is not
because of any particular philosophical attraction between Republican judges and
the concept of a powerful presidency but because Republican judges, like Demo-
cratic judges, are more supportive of presidents of their own party. Since more than
70 percent of the cases included in this study were decided in the period dating from
the inauguration of Richard Nixon in 1969, Republican judicial support could result
from the simple fact that during this period Republicans controlled the White House
three times longer than did Democrats (twelve years as compared with four).
Are There "Two Presidencies"?
When the relationship of president and party to judges' votes is examined
according to the type of power involved, it provides an appropriate context in which
to consider whether there are not in fact "two presidencies." Scholarship analyzing
the legislative process has suggested that there are two quite different spheres of
executive influence. Based upon his analysis of roll call votes in Congress on
presidential proposals from 1948 to 1964, Aaron Wildavsky reported that presidents
experienced markedly greater success in the realm of foreign and defense policy than
domestic policy.22 While the postwar presidents in this period (Truman to Johnson)
experienced legislative success about 40 percent of the time in domestic affairs,
congressional support in the realm of foreign and military policy was approximately
30 points higher.23 In light of this gap in legislative support for presidential powers,
Wildavsky argued that the interbranch relationship might more usefully be portrayed
22 Wildavsky, The Two Presidencies, in THE PRESIDENCY (A. Wildavsky, ed. 1969).
23 Id. at 23 1.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4
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in terms of two distinctly different realms of executive power.
That the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of two different presiden-
cies, however, has not been something scholars have had to infer. Over halfa century
ago, Justice Sutherland announced as much in his opinion for the Court in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.24 Both as a matter of constitutional theory and
political practicality, the Court embraced the proposition that the president's
authority, leadership, and independence were markedly greater in the conduct of
foreign affairs than in the formulation of domestic policy. 25 Even Justice Jackson
who saw considerable ambiguity and fluidity in presidential power domestically, as
we have noted, explicitly acknowledged the Court's recognition in Curtiss-Wright
that the president was operating in a different sphere when conducting foreign
policy.2 6 In light of this explicit recognition by the Court, we thought it was doubly
important to examine whether federal judges during the postwar period considered
presidential power cases in terms of this duality.
The ten policy areas included in our study were partitioned into the realms of
foreign and military powers, on the one hand, and domestic powers, on the other. The
judicial votes cast in these two realms of presidential power were then arrayed
according to the relationship of president and party to judges' votes. These
distributions are presented in Tables 3 and 4 for foreign and military powers and
domestic powers respectively.
24 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
25 Disagreement still persists, however, over the exact scope of the Court's holding in Curtiss-Wright.
Probably the most recent evidence of this surfaced in the colloquy between Col. Oliver North and Sen. George
Mitchell during the joint hearings conducted by the select House and Senate committees investigating the
Iran-Contra affair. Col. North in effect argued that the Court recognized the president's authority for
conducting foreign affairs was substantially extra-constitutional. Sen. Mitchell, a former federal judge,
asserted the Court had held nothing more than that the parameters of Congress' authority to delegate power
to the president were wider in foreign than domestic affairs. Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings
Before the Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and
the House Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 38-39
(1987) (testimony of Col. Oliver L. North, Pt. 2).
26 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-636 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring). As that
portion of his opinion makes clear, there is no question about whose interpretation Justice Jackson would have
favored in the clash between Col. North and Sen. Mitchell, see supra note 25; it would have been Sen.
Mitchell's.
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Comparison of the data in these tables provides impressive confirmation of the
"two presidencies" thesis. Postwar presidents from Truman to Reagan received
support from federal judges and justices 57.2 percent of the time on domestic
policymaking, but when the policymaking focus changed to foreign and military
policy, presidential support increased more than 20 points to 78.4 percent. It is nearly
always true that same president-same party judges show the highest degree of
support and it is likewise equally true that different president-different party judges
support presidents the least, with the remaining judges falling somewhere in
between. While all three groups of judges show greater presidential support as one
moves from domestic to foreign and military policy, what is especially noteworthy
in confirming the "two presidencies" thesis is that the greatest proportional increase
in support comes from that group of judges and justices least inclined to favor the
president. The different president-different party judges increased their support
from 51.6 percent to 75.5 percent, nearly 24 points.
Although our findings confirm the "two presidencies" thesis as applied to
judicial support for exercises of presidential power during the postwar era, we are
mindful of the fact that Wildavsky's research appeared twenty five years ago. Since
then, other scholars have argued that congressional support for the president in the
realm of foreign and defense policy has deteriorated to a point where it is not
significantly higher than that enjoyed by the president in domestic affairs, and,
furthermore, that presidential success with Congress has declined overall.27 We
were interested in examining whether these revisionist corollaries held true for presi-
dential success in the federal courts as well. Table 5 presents data on judicial support
2 7See LeLoup & Shull, Congress Versus the Executive: The "Two Presidencies" Reconsidered, 59 Soc. Sci.
Q. 704 (1979); Zeidenstein, The Two Presidencies Thesis Is Alive and Well and Has Been Living in the U.S.
Senate Since 1973, 11 PRES. STUD. Q. 511 (1981). Indeed, legislatively speaking, there is some evidence that
the "two presidencies" phenomenon may exist only for presidents of one party, see Fleisher & Bond, Are
There Two Presidencies? Yes, But OnlyforRepublicans, 50 J. OF POL. 747 (1988). However, examining only
key votes on major issues, as distinguished from Wildavsky's inclusion of all roll call votes involving
presidential initiatives, whether major or minor, another scholar found no support for Wildavsky's
conclusion, see Sigelman, A Reassessment of the Two Presidencies Thesis, 41 J. OF POL. 1195 (1979); but see
Shull & LeLoup, Reassessing the Reassessment: Comment on Sigelman's Note on the "Two Presidencies,"
43 J. OF POL. 563 (1981). Finally, in an article that weaves several of these conclusions together, yet another
scholar of the presidency observed:
[T]he two presidencies did flourish under President Eisenhower, but the additional support for
foreign policies that characterizes the two presidencies has been modest since the 1960s and no longer reliably
appears. Moreover, the locus of additional support for foreign policy has always been the opposition party.
... Contrary to the conventional wisdom, analysis reveals that the source of the two presidencies
is not congressional bipartisanship or deference in foreign affairs, nor is it the relative advantages of the
president in foreign policymaking. Instead, the two presidencies appears to be a natural outgrowth of a
president proposing foreign policies, but not domestic policies, that appeal to a substantial segment of the
opposition party. Similarly, we cannot attribute the decline of the two presidencies to the trauma of Vietnam.
Simply stated, when the appeal of a president's foreign policies to the opposition diminishes, so does the two
presidencies.
Edwards, The Two Presidencies: A Reevaluation, 14 AMER. POL. Q. 247, 261-262 (1986).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 22 [1989], Iss. 4, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss4/4
FEDERAL JUDGES & PRESIDENTIAL POWER: TRUMAN TO REAGAN
of presidential power for each of the policy areas in the realms of foreign and military
affairs and domestic affairs partitioned into two periods of time which roughly can
be described as during and after the time period covered by Wildavsky's article.
TABLE 5
JUDICIAL SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENTIAL POWER DURING EARLY AND LATER
PERIODS OF THE POST-WAR ERA
1949- 1968 1969- 1984
Total Percent Total Percent
Judges' Supp. Judges' Supp.
Policy Area Votes Pres. Votes Pres.
Foreign Affairs
War Powers
Military Personnel
FOREIGN AND
MILITARY POLICY
Spending
Law Enforcement
Appoint./Removal
Economic Regulation
Pres. Privilege
Legislative Power
Pardoning
DOMESTIC POLICY
ALL POLICY AREAS
144 63.9
107 86.9
49 89.8
300 76.3
16 62.5
23 47.8
63 74.6
46 58.7
1 0.0
22 100.0
6 100.0
177 69.4
477 73.7
228 78.5
84 84.5
6 100.0
318 80.5
78 37.2
164 48.8
84 64.3
20 80.0
79 31.6
48 77.1
22 77.3
495 52.1
813 63.0
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Although there has been approximately a 10-point decline in judicial support
for presidential power overall (from 73.7 percent to 63 percent) between these two
periods, there is no evidence to suggest that this increased policitization has dimin-
ished judicial support for presidential actions in the area of foreign and military
affairs. Indeed, our data show a slight increase in presidential success of about 4
points (from 76.3 percent to 80.5 percent).
What is significant, however, is that the gap between judicial support for
presidential actions in foreign and military affairs as distinguished from domestic
affairs has widened noticeably. For the first two decades of the postwar era,
approximately 7 points separated judicial support for presidential action in foreign
and military matters (76.3 percent) from that given domestic policy actions (69.4
percent). Since 1969, however, that gap has widened to 28 points (80.5 percent
support in foreign and military affairs to 52.1 percent in domestic affairs). As Table
5 shows, the principal reason for this is deteriorating judicial support for presiden-
tial action in domestic affairs.
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Table 6 arrays judicial support for presidential actions in the major policy
realms for these two periods in terms of the relationship of president and party to
judges' votes. As the figures in Table 6 make clear, the largest single factor
associated with the widening gap in judicial support for presidential foreign/military
actions as against domestic policy actions is the precipitous decline in support in
domestic affairs by different president-different party judges and justices. Compar-
ing the period 1949-1968 with that of 1969-1984, their support declined from 73.2
percent to 44.4 percent, a drop of nearly 30 points. That presidents have experienced
diminished judicial support is mainly attributable, therefore, to the increasing polari-
zation of the federal bench in the area of domestic policy.
Judicial Independence
The loyalty of new federal judges to the appointing president prompted us to
examine further the factor of judicial independence. Since the jurisdiction of their
courts emanates from art. III of the Constitution, the judges and justices included in
this study enjoyed tenure during good behavior, which is to say life tenure. Life
tenure, like the guarantee that judicial compensation will not be diminished during
tenure in office, reflects a commitment to the principle of judicial independence. In
view of this, we wondered if increased tenure on the federal bench was associated
with increased resistance to exercises of presidential power.
Table 7 arrays positive and negative judicial votes according to the length of
the judge's tenure on the federal bench at the time of decision. The data show some
support for the observation that, as judicial tenure increases, so does judicial
opposition to presidential power. There is an apparent trend as one moves through
judicial tenure at five-year intervals. Federal judges with five years of service or less
supported presidential power about 70 percent of the time. With better than a decade
of experience, this general support score dropped about 3 points; and after finishing
a second decade on the federal bench, presidential support fell 6 more points.
Spring, 1989]
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TABLE 7
JUDICIAL TENURE AND JUDGES' VOTES
Judicial Votes Judicial Votes
Supporting Opposing
the President the President
Years on the
Federal Bench N Percent N Percent
0-5 290 70.4 122 29.6
6-10 217 67.6 104 32.4
11 - 15 204 66.7 102 33.3
16-20 117 66.9 58 33.1
Over 20 84 60.4 55 39.6
TOTAL 912 67.0 441 33.0
It is possible, however, that any relationship between length of judicial tenure
and declining presidential support in fact may be a reflection of the basic relationship
of president and party to judges' votes. Given the time lag characteristic of the
federal courts, created by the combination of presidential appointment and life
tenure, it is likely that the bulk of those judges with the least tenure were appointed
by the incumbent administration while judges with greater tenure were appointed by
not only a different president, but one of a different political party. Table 8 presents
data on judicial support for presidential power when votes according to judicial
tenure are arrayed against the relationship between president and party.
[Vol. 22:4
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TABLE 8
RELATION OF PRESIDENT AND PARTY TO JUDGES' VOTES IN THE CONTEXT
OF LENGTH OF SERVICE ON THE FEDERAL BENCH
Diff. Pres.-
Same Party &
Same Pres.- Same Pres.- Diff. Pres.-
Same Party Diff. Party Diff. Party
Percent Percent Percent
Years of Total Supp. Total Supp. Total Supp.
Service Votes Pres. Votes Pres. Votes Pres.
0 - 5 185 79.4 77 64.9 225 36.0
6-10 22 68.1 100 74.0 197 64.9
11- 15 6 33.3 147 73.4 135 60.7
16-20 0 0.0 63 73.0 104 64.4
Over 20 1 100.0 53 67.9 79 53.1
While Table 8 lends support to the proposition that judicial tenure may be a
factor negating presidential support for some president-same party judges,, there is
no evidence to suggest it is a significant factor in the behavior of federal judges
generally. Indeed, the data in Table 8 suggest that the most significant pocket of
opposition to presidential power is not long-entrenched federal judges whose
guaranteed tenure has made them feisty, but relatively recent appointees of a
previous administration whose party was not continued in office. In the context of
the support scores presented in Table 8, this is the logical conclusion to be drawn
from the remarkably low presidential support score of 36 percent registered by the
votes of different president-different party judges with five years of service or less
on the federal bench.
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Prior Executive or Legislative Experience
A fourth and final factor which we considered was prior executive or legisla-
tive experience. We thought that federal judges who previously had served in the
executive branch, either at the federal or state level, might sympathize with a
president resisting limitations on his powers of office, 28 while judges with prior leg-
islative experience might be more prone to resist exercises of executive power.
TABLE 9
RELATIONSHIP OF PRIOR EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE EXPERIENCE TO
JUDGES' VOTES ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Supporting Opposing
the President the President
Experience Votes Percent Votes Percent
FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY
CASES
No experience 184 82.1 60 17.9
Executive experience only 62 69.6 27 30.4
Legislative experience only 39 68.4 18 31.6
Executive and legislative experience 22 91.6 2 8.4
DOMESTIC POLICY CASES
No experience 323 61.1 206 38.9
Executive experience only 143 66.5 72 33.5
Legislative experience only 83 71.6 33 28.4
Executive and legislative experience 26 78.8 7 21.2
ALL CASES
No experience 507 65.6 266 34.4
Executive experience only 205 67.4 99 32.6
Legislative experience only 122 70.5 51 29.5
Executive and legislative experience 48 84.2 9 15.8
28 Surely one of the most direct statements of this thesis is to be found in the introductory remarks of Justice
Jackson in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,634-635 (1952).
[Vol. 22:4AKRON LAW REVIEW
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Table 9 arrays the data on the votes cast by federal judges and justices in cases
on presidential power by major policy area and by judge's possession of prior
executive or legislative experience, both, or none. The data present an ambiguous
pattem.29
It seems clear, however, that there is no support to be found in the data in Table
9 for the notion that votes cast by judges with prior executive experience at either the
federal or state level are particularly associated with greater than average support for
presidential power. Likewise, there is nothing to support the belief that judges with
prior legislative experience are more likely to be hostile to exercises of executive
power. Indeed, we were surprised to find that the votes cast by federal judges with
legislative, as opposed to executive, experience tended to favor presidential power
even more often (70.5 percent support as contrasted with 67.4 percent). Moreover,
votes cast by judges with both prior executive and legislative experience tended
more often (84.2 percent) to favor presidential actions than votes cast by judges who
did not have such dual experience. Since the lowest general level of support given
presidential power came in the votes associated with judges who had neither
executive nor legislative experience before appointment to the federal bench, there
may be some truth in the proposition that prior officeholding experience in the ex-
ecutive or legislative branch is associated with greater sympathy for presidential
actions than is its absence.
CONCLUSION
Our examination of the votes cast by federal judges and justices in cases on
presidential power during the postwar era has focused on four factors thought to
affect judicial decisionmaking: political party affiliation and presidential appoint-
ment, the difference between foreign and military policy and domestic policy, the
length of judicial tenure, and judicial possession of prior executive or legislative
experience. Examining the first of these factors, we found that presidential support
was highest in the votes cast by judges who were appointed by the same president
whose power was at issue and who shared a common party affiliation. Least
supportive of presidential power were the votes cast by judges appointed by a
different president of the opposite party. We also found strong support for the "two
presidencies" thesis that the president experiences a higher level of support in the
realm of foreign and military affairs than in domestic affairs. Our evidence suggests
However, it is worth recalling, particularly in light of the findings which we report, that while Justice Jackson
empathized with "the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems
of executive power as they actually present themselves[,] . Id. at 634. He nevertheless voted in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube to invalidate President Truman's seizure of the steel mills.
29 Table 9 contains an apparent anomaly. Some same president-same party judges have periods of tenure so
extensive as to reach beyond any legally possible duration of a president's term of office., at least since the
adoption of the Twenty-Second Amendment. The explanation lies in the fact that calculation of a judge's
or justice's tenure dates from his initial appointment to the federal bench. If a district judge is elevated to
an appellate judgeship, for example, his votes after his second appointment are evaluated in terms of his
relation to the president making the more recent appointment, but his tenure is not recalculated from that date.
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that the validity of the "two presidencies" thesis is growing and that the widening
gap in support which recent presidents have received in foreign and military policy
as compared with domestic policy is associated with a significant decline in support
for domestic policy actions by different president-different party judges.
We found little or ambiguous support for the influence of the two remaining
factors, length of judicial tenure and judicial possession of prior executive or
legislative experience. Although increased tenure on the bench appeared to be
associated with diminished presidential loyalty by same president-same party
judges, there was no evidence that opposition to presidential power could be
attributed to the length of judicial entrenchment. Nor could we find evidence to
confirm supposition that votes cast by judges with prior executive experience would
be more sympathetic to presidential power while those with only legislative
experience would be more hostile. At best, we found mild support for the proposition
that prior officeholding experience of either sort was generally associated with
judicial votes more supportive of presidential power than was apparent in the votes
of judges with no such officeholding experience at all.
It is unclear whether these observations about political factors associated with
judicial deference and constraint on executive power disclose "new patterns in
judicial control of the presidency" 3 ° since the cases included in this study go back
no further than President Truman's elected term of office. Nor is it likely that an
analysis of cases prior to that could be conducted in the manner we have done here,
since the frequency of cases challenging assertions of presidential power is largely
a contemporary phenomenon. But whether these simultaneous patterns of constraint
and deference are new or not, it is clear that presidential powers are not all cut from
the same cloth. The prospect of presidential success in federal court appears to be
closely related to the kind of executive power at issue. In judicial-executive relations
at least, there are indeed "two presidencies." Finally, as Justice Jackson suggested
when the postwar era was still in its infancy, in the decision of cases involving
challenges to the exercise of domestic presidential power, it makes much more of a
difference who the judge is than what previous judges have said.
10 See supra note 9.
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APPENDIX
The cases on presidential power that were included in this study are arrayed
below according to the type of power involved. The citations given below may
present an incomplete history of a given case because other rulings in the controversy
were not identified according to our rules for case selection or did not implicate
presidential power as we have defined it. Citations in this Appendix are only to those
cases included in this study.
FOREIGN AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
Foreign Affairs
Ozanic v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), affd, 188 F.2d
228 (2d Cir. 1951).
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 88 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), affd, 179 F.2d 628 (2d
Cir. 1950).
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Watkins, 173 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1949).
Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
McGrath v. Cities Service Co. 93 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), rev'd, 189 F.2d 744
(2d Cir. 1951), 342 U.S. 330 (1952).
United States ex rel. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 97 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc. 100 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Va. 195 1), aff d, 204 F.2d
655 (4th Cir. 1953).
United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 101 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), affd
in part and rev'd in part 195 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
Tucker v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
S. J. Charia & Co. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 727 (Cust.Ct. 1954).
Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
American Bitumuls & Asphalt Co. v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 703 (Cust.Ct.
1956).
Dayton v. Dulles, 146 F. Supp. 876 (D.D.C. 1956). Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United
States, 154 F. Supp. 203 (Cust.Ct. 1957), affd 281 F.2d 954 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
Best Foods, Inc. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 583 (Cust. Ct. 1957).
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
Eastern States Petroleum & Chem. Corp. v. Seaton, 163 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1958).
Schmidt Pritchard & Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 272 (Cust. Ct. 1958)
Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 268 (Cust. Ct. 1958), affd 275
F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
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Cheng Fu Sheng v. Rogers, 177 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 1959).
United States v. Broverman, 180 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
Porter v. Herter, 278 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Marcello v. Kennedy, 194 F. Supp. 750 (D.D.C. 1961).
United States v. Travis, 241 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
Zemel v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1964), aff d, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
MacEwan v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl.
1964).
United States v. Laub, 253 F. Supp. 433 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), aff d 385 U.S. 475 (1967).
Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Welch v. Kennedy, 319 F.Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1970).
Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. United States, 324 F.Supp. 514 (Cust.Ct. 1971).
Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
E. Dillingham, Inc. v. United States, 328 F.Supp. 1392 (Cust.Ct. 1971).
Fiocconi v. Att'y Gen. of United States, 339 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
Avranova v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
Yoshida Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust.Ct. 1974), rev'd, 526
F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
United States v. Gurrola-Garcia, 547 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1976).
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Drummond v. Bunker, 560 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1977).
Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977).
Dole v. Carter, 444 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Kan. 1977), affd, 569 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir.
1977).
Edwards v. Carter, 445 F.Supp. 1279 (D.D.C. 1978), aff d, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
Smith v. Eagleton, 455 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
Guerra v. Guajardo, 466 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
Mease v. Heinz, 80 F.R.D. 119 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
United States v. Hooker, 607 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1979).
Rossi v. Brown, 467 F. Supp. 960 (D.D.C. 1979), affd sub nom. Weinberger v.
Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979), 699
F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1983).
Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.),
judg. vacated 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
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Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280 (1981).
Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980).
Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980).
National Airmotive Corp. v. Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1980).
Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), judg.
modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Miller, 504 F. Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1980)
Electronic Data Systems v. Social Sec. Org. of Gov't of Iran, 508 F.Supp. 1350 (N.D.
Tex. 1981), rev'd 651 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1981)
Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981)
Chas. T. Main Int'l v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Mass.), affd, sub nom
Chas. T. Main Int'l v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, 651 F.2d 800 (1 st Cir.
1981)
Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Mass. 198 1),judg. vacated 704
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
Unidyne Corp. v. Iran, 512 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Va. 1981).
Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Iran, 513 F. Supp. 864 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines, 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
American Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
Akbari v. Godshall, 524 F. Supp. 635 (D. Colo. 1981).
Elwood v. Lehman, 525 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va. 1981).
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